Not Everything Called Continuous Red Teaming Is Red Teaming

Over the past few years, “continuous red teaming” has become a broad label for security testing services that can look very different in practice. Ask vendors to define it, and you may get different answers: automated simulations against endpoint detection and response (EDR) and security information and event management (SIEM) controls, software that continuously discovers and attempts to exploit exposed assets, or a human-led campaign that emulates a specific threat actor over several weeks. All three may appear in a proposal under the same name, yet each definition represents a different approach to security validation, proving through real testing that your defenses work, and produces entirely different evidence.

This confusion matters because the choice of assessment must match the specific security question you are trying to answer. Unfortunately, that principle becomes difficult to apply when terms such as “breach and attack simulation,” “attack path validation,” “adversary emulation,” and “continuous red teaming”  are used interchangeably in vendor proposals.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has added another layer of ambiguity. “AI red teaming” may describe using AI to accelerate reconnaissance and attack execution, testing an AI application or its connected systems for security weaknesses, or evaluating an AI model for safety and bias. Because these activities have different objectives and scopes, organizations need a clear way to cut through the marketing overlap.

By the end of this article, you will know which approach answers which question, and you will have a concise list of questions to take into your next vendor conversation.

Why the Distinction is not Academic

The same environment can produce very different results depending on what is being tested, how the test is conducted, and what the assessment is intended to establish.

Consider an organization that receives a control-validation report showing a 90% block rate against simulated attacker techniques. During the same quarter, a red team engagement reaches the domain controller within two days without triggering an alert. While contradictory in appearance, both results can be accurate: the first measured how individual controls responded to known techniques, while the second examined whether an adaptive adversary could navigate the environment and reach a defined objective. A 90% block rate means one in ten techniques got through, and an attacker typically needs only one.

This distinction goes beyond theory. Regulatory frameworks increasingly demand specific types of security assessments. For instance, CERT-In’s Comprehensive Cyber Security Audit Policy Guidelines list red team assessments as a distinct requirement within the broader audit framework. Similarly, entities governed by the RBI’s IT Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices Directions, 2023 must conduct vulnerability assessments and penetration tests at strict intervals tied to system lifecycles and asset criticality such as semi-annual testing for internet-facing systems rather than relying on automated exposure tools alone.

In practice, a breach and attack simulation (BAS) report or a continuous testing subscription does not automatically satisfy a regulatory requirement for a formal red team assessment or a manual penetration test. Before choosing a service, always check which exact type of assessment your regulations or auditors demand.

One Attack Path, Five Lenses

The clearest way to separate these approaches is to examine them against the same attack path.

A quick note before we start: Four of these five options are methods, which means they are different ways of testing. “Continuous red teaming” is different because it describes how often testing happens. It is not a separate method, but rather a schedule that can be applied to different methods, which explains why the label covers so many varied services.

Consider this illustrative attack path: an attacker exploits a vulnerable VPN gateway (T1190), dumps privileged credentials (T1003), moves through Active Directory using valid accounts and remote services (T1078 and T1021), and encrypts critical servers (T1486).

Here is how each approach would assess that exact scenario.

1. Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS): Security Control Validation

Breach and attack simulation uses automated, controlled simulations of attacker techniques against security controls such as EDR, SIEM, email security, firewalls, and network detection.

On this attack path, BAS could safely simulate credential dumping and lateral movement, showing technique by technique what was blocked, what was detected, and where no telemetry was generated. Results are commonly mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, allowing organizations to track control coverage and identify changes over time.

BAS is useful when security teams need frequent, repeatable validation of controls across a changing environment without the need for intrusive exploitation of production systems. However, it does not establish whether the VPN gateway is exploitable, whether an attacker can gain a foothold, or whether that foothold can be used to reach the domain controller. The value of BAS is not simply knowing that a control blocked a technique once but verifying that protection continues to hold as the environment evolves.

2. Attack Path Validation

Attack path validation takes exposures that may appear unrelated and tests whether they can be chained into a viable route toward a defined target. On our example attack path, the assessment would begin with the VPN foothold and determine whether an attacker could use it to obtain privileged credentials, move through the environment, and reach the domain controller while identifying where segmentation, authentication, privilege controls, or other defenses interrupt the chain.

The assessment can be automated, human-led, or a combination of both. Its purpose is to establish whether individual weaknesses form a viable attack route and where that route succeeds or fails. Three moderate weaknesses that can be chained together often present greater real-world exposure than a single high-severity finding with no path to a critical asset. However, attack path validation does not, by itself, establish whether the security team would detect the activity or respond before the objective is reached.

3. Threat and Adversary Emulation

Threat and adversary emulation reproduces the documented behavior of a specific threat actor to test detection and response. On this attack path, an emulation could follow the techniques and procedures associated with a ransomware group relevant to the organization, moving from initial access and privilege escalation through lateral movement and payload deployment showing where the security operation center (SOC) detected the activity, how it responded, and whether those actions prevented the adversary from reaching its objective.

Although “threat emulation” and “adversary emulation” are often used interchangeably, a more useful distinction lies between simulation and emulation. Simulation typically reproduces selected attacker behaviors or techniques, often through automation. In contrast, adversary emulation uses threat intelligence to reproduce the relevant behaviors, techniques, and objectives associated with a defined adversary, providing evidence of detection and response against a specific playbook rather than broad coverage of possible attack paths.

Emulation can also be run with automated tools, which is where it overlaps with BAS. The difference comes down to intent: BAS checks whether controls respond to individual techniques, whereas emulation follows one adversary’s playbook in strict sequence to test the response. Its primary limitation is that it only shows how you handle one specific adversary, offering little insight into attack routes that an actor would not use, and its accuracy depends entirely on the quality of the underlying threat intelligence.

4. Red Team Assessment

A red team assessment is a human-led, goal-oriented engagement in which operators receive a defined objective and rules of engagement and then determine how to pursue that objective within agreed constraints. They can change techniques, alter the attack path, exploit other weaknesses, compromise identities, use social engineering, and test people and processes alongside technology.

Its defining characteristic is the operators’ ability to adapt based on what happens during the engagement, making it uniquely capable of exploring emerging attack paths. In our example attack path, a real red team might bypass the VPN entirely, phish an employee, use leaked credentials, or enter through a supplier and choose whichever route works.

This approach tests what other methods cannot: whether the SOC notices, how quickly it responds, and how people behave under pressure. Typically, only a few senior stakeholders know the exercise is happening, while strict rules of engagement protect production systems. However, red teaming has limits. It is a point-in-time snapshot, it will not find every weakness, its results depend heavily on team skill, and it costs more than automated options. It answers a fundamentally different question rather than simply acting as a better version of other tests.

5. Continuous Red Teaming

Providers use continuous red teaming (CRT) to describe various forms of recurring security validation, including continuous attack-surface discovery, automated exploitation, recurring human-led testing, or combinations of these activities. On this attack path, a CRT service could identify when a VPN appliance comes online or changes version, and test whether it can be exploited. That same asset could then be retested after remediation or environment changes.

Our view is that “continuous” should describe the schedule, not replace the method. If no human attacker is choosing targets and adapting the approach, the service is continuous automated exposure testing, which is valuable, but it’s not red teaming. When skilled operators are involved on a recurring basis, it functions closer to a recurring red team engagement. The three most common models are automated discovery and exploitation tools, tools combined with scheduled human testers, and recurring human-led campaigns.

This reduces the gap between scheduled assessments and attack surface changes. However, not every CRT service follows an identified weakness through attack-path chaining or post-exploitation. Many stop at proving an asset is exploitable, typically bypassing SOC detection testing, phishing, physical access, or insider routes.

Because “continuous” can mean many things, always ask a provider what runs daily, weekly, and yearly, and whether a tool or a person reviews the results.

The Five Approaches at a Glance

The table below summarizes what each approach is designed to answer, and what it will not tell you.

Approach	Question it answers	Who does the work	What you get	What it does not tell you
Breach and attack simulation (BAS)	Are security controls blocking and detecting known techniques?	Mostly automated	Technique-by-technique results, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK	Whether an attacker can get in or reach a target
Attack path validation	Can separate weaknesses be chained to reach a defined target?	Varies: automated, human, or both	A confirmed route to the target, and where it breaks	Whether the SOC would detect or respond
Adversary emulation	Would the organization detect and stop a specific, relevant threat actor?	Human-led or tool-assisted	Detection and response results against one adversary’s playbook	Routes that an adversary would not use
Red team assessment	Can a skilled attacker reach a defined objective, and will the organization notice?	Human-led	An account of how the objective was reached and how defenders responded	Full coverage of weaknesses; it is a point-in-time view
Continuous red teaming (a schedule, not a method)	Has the attack surface changed, and is the new exposure exploitable?	Varies: automated, human, or both	Recurring findings on new or changed assets	Often stops at the first foothold; may not test detection

Where Penetration Testing and Purple Teaming Fit

Two other terms often appear alongside these validation methods. A vulnerability assessment and penetration test (VAPT) is a time-boxed effort to find and prove as many exploitable weaknesses as possible within a defined scope, such as an application, network, or cloud environment. It is broader and more systematic than red teaming, but it usually does not test whether the security team notices or responds. Red teaming, by contrast, pursues a single objective and tests whether anyone catches it.

Purple teaming is a collaborative exercise in which attackers and defenders work together in real time, running techniques, checking whether they were detected, and tuning detections on the spot. It functions closer to an improvement exercise than an independent test. Additionally, providers may use terms like “automated pentesting” or “continuous threat exposure management” (CTEM) for services that overlap with the continuous models described above.

Three different Meanings of AI Red Teaming”

Artificial intelligence red teaming does not describe a single testing methodology. Instead, the term generally covers three distinct activities:

• AI-assisted red teaming: Uses AI to accelerate reconnaissance, attack-surface analysis, finding correlation, and attack-scenario generation. AI changes how testing is performed, but it does not change the underlying security objective.
• Red teaming for AI systems: Tests LLM applications, AI agents, Retrieval‑augmented Generation(RAG)implementations, model integrations, and connected tools or data for weaknesses such as prompt injection, sensitive-data exposure, excessive agency, insecure tool use, and authorization flaws.
• Red teaming for model safety: Tests whether a model can be pushed into harmful, biased, or policy-violating outputs. It is closely related to security testing, but functions as a fundamentally different exercise.

When a vendor offers AI-related testing, ask whether AI is being used to test the environment or if it is the actual target being tested. Clarify where data goes, whether it is sent to a public model, and whether a person reviews the AI’s findings before they reach your team. For evaluating AI systems specifically, the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and MITRE ATLAS serve as the standard frameworks.

The Takeaway

Security validation is most useful when the testing method directly matches the assurance question. Control validation, continuous red teaming, attack path testing, adversary emulation, and red teaming all produce valuable evidence, but they answer fundamentally different questions. A strong program applies the right depth and type of testing to the risk at hand, rather than assuming that services described under the same label are equivalent.

These approaches are not mutually exclusive; a holistic security program usually layers them. Organizations often deploy continuous, largely automated validation to keep up with daily changes, supplemented by deeper human-led testing once or twice a year to evaluate how defenders respond under pressure. If foundational controls such as asset visibility, patching, and multi-factor authentication are not yet in place, organizations should prioritize an attack surface assessment and VAPT before investing in advanced red teaming.

At Anzen, testing begins with the question rather than the tool. Attack surface assessments establish what is exposed, VAPT engagements validate what can be exploited across external, internal, cloud, API, wireless, and Active Directory environments, and red teaming, adversary emulation, and intelligence-led engagements examine how attack paths, controls, detection, and response hold up against relevant adversaries. The goal is to provide security leaders with actionable evidence to understand where defenses stand and where further validation is warranted. If you are unsure which approach fits your situation, our team can help you frame the question first.

When evaluating a security validation proposal, look beyond the service name and ask what the engagement will actually establish. That is where similar-sounding services differ in value.

Questions to Ask Before You Choose Your Service

Before signing off on any service, use these questions to ensure the engagement actually matches the organization’s assurance needs:

Methodology and Execution

• Who does the testing: A tool, a person, or a combination of both?
• Can the testers adapt: Do operators change their approach mid-engagement based on discoveries, or do they strictly follow a fixed script?
• What runs continuously: If the service is marketed as “continuous,” what exactly runs, how often, and who reviews the results?

Scope and Safety

• What is the objective: Who defines the target, and is the goal a point-in-time check or an objective-driven campaign?
• How are production systems protected: Will weaknesses be actively exploited in live environments, and what concrete safeguards are in place?
• Will the security team know: Is the SOC notified in advance to test detection, or is the test kept hidden to measure real-world response?

Deliverables and Compliance

• What is the output: Will the deliverable be a raw vulnerability score, a prioritized list of findings, or a narrative account of how an objective was reached?
• Is remediation supported: Are retests included after fixes are implemented?
• Does it satisfy stakeholders: Does the methodology align with the specific expectations of internal auditors, boards, or relevant regulators (such as CERT-In or RBI guidelines)?

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